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[WAI]hether the practice of senatorial courtesy is or is not constitutional . . . is a nonjusticiable issue which the court should not
undertake to resolve. Whether the practice is to be longer sanctioned or finally condemned must be determined at the bar of
public opinion.'
The New Jersey Superior Court recently held that, under the

political question doctrine, the practice of senatorial courtesy is immune from judicial evaluation. As a result, this unwritten rule of the
Senate should continue to serve in New Jersey as an effective check on
the virtually unlimited power of the governor to fill positions through-

out the state with men of his personal choice.

On April 2, 1969, pursuant to the requirements of the New Jersey
Constitution, 2 Governor Richard J. Hughes indicated his intention to
nominate three men for vacant judgeships in Passaic County.3 Nominations for these offices were sent to the Senate on April

10,

1969.

Nominations for two other vacant judgeships 4 were likewise submitted
for Senate advice and consent on August 6, 1969. No action was taken
by the Senate with respect to any of these nominations. As a result of
the shortage of judges, a suspension of the trial of all civil cases was

announced by the Passaic County Assignment Judge, effective with
the commencement of the September, 1969 term of court.
Plaintiff, Passaic County Bar Association, is a nonprofit member1 Passaic County Bar Ass'n v. Hughes, 108 N.J. Super. 161, 173, 260 A.2d 261, 268 (Ch.
Div. 1969).
2 N.J. CONST. art. VI, § 6, par. 1:
The Governor shall nominate and appoint, with the advice and consent of the
Senate, the Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, the Judges
of the Superior Court, the Judges of the County Courts and the judges of the
inferior courts with jurisdiction extending to more than one municipality. No
nomination to such an office shall be sent to the Senate for confirmation until
after seven days' public notice by the Governor.
3 A vacancy occurred in the office of Judge of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court on April 28, 1967; on June 28, 1967, an additional County Court judgeship was
created by act of the Legislature; and on September 7, 1967, a judge of the Passaic County
District Court died.
4 On August 1, 1969, a judge of the Passaic County Court was mandatorily retired
by reason of age. The previous day, the Governor gave public notice of his intention to
nominate a judge of the Passaic County District Court to succeed the retiring County
Court judge, and of his further intention to fill the ensuing vacancy on the District Court
with a designated nominee.

NOTES

ship corporation consisting of several hundred attorneys practicing or
residing in Passaic County. The Bar Association charged that, as a
consequence of the Senate's inaction in confirming the nominations,
"there are a disproportionately large number of judicial vacancies in
Passaic County, ...
virtually ceased, ...

the trial of civil law actions in the county has
and . . . the courts have the necessary competence

to grant the relief sought." 5
The Senate's procrastination with regard to the judgeship nominations was due to the practice of senatorial courtesy. Briefly stated, this
is the tradition by which senators will respect the objection of a fellow
senator and vote against, or refuse to vote for, the confirmation of an
appointee to a political position in the objecting senator's home district. The first case of senatorial courtesy on the national level occurred
in 1789, only three months after the commencement of Congress's first
term. 6 This practice has since been invoked on both the federal and
state levels of government, sometimes openly, at other times more dis7
creetly, but usually quite effectively.
Disregarding the political ramifications inherent in these, and indeed any, nominations and confirmations, the court in the case at bar
had as its primary issue the constitutionality of senatorial courtesy.
Without deciding this issue, the court simply determined that, based
on the political question doctrine as derived from the separation of
powers clause of the state constitution," it could not judge the legality
of that practice. Disposition of the case on the ground of nonjusticiability made it unnecessary to reach the claims on the merits.
A political question has been defined as that inquiry which has
been "entrusted by the sovereign for decision to the so-called political
departments of government, as distinguished from questions which the
5 108 N.J. Super. at 163-64, 260 A.2d at 263.

6 President Washington had nominated one Benjamin Fishbourn to fill the post of
naval officer at the Port of Savannah, and although he was well qualified for that position,
actually holding at the time by virtue of a state appointment an office similar to that
which Washington desired to appoint him, the Senate rejected the nomination as a
courtesy to the two senators from Georgia who had a candidate of their own, one Lachlan
McIntosh, a prominent politician in the state. The following day Washington withdrew
the nomination in deference to the two Georgia senators, and nominated their candidate.
See J. HARRIS, THE ADVICE AND CONSENT OF THE SENATE 40 (1953); H.J. FORD, WASHINGTON
AND His COLLEAGUES 90 (1918).
7 See generally Harris, supra note 6, at ch. XIII.
8 N.J. CONST. art. III, par. 1:

The powers of the government shall be divided among three distinct branches,
the legislative, executive, and judicial. No person or persons belonging to or
constituting one branch shall exercise any of the powers properly belonging to
either of the others, except as expressly provided in this Constitution.
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sovereign has set to be decided in the courts." 9 However, such a
"definition" is hardly helpful in identifying a political question, since
its essential characteristic is presented as its being the object of executive or legislative determination, and no more. True, the political
question is "primarily a function of the separation of powers; '"10 however, merely because another governmental department has original
jurisdiction over a matter is not conclusive.
All controversies political in nature are not necessarily political
questions. In determining whether this doctrine should be invoked, a
court will examine the controversy and then, after it satisfies itself that
the question as presented is nonjusticiable, will justify its inaction by
calling the issue a "political question." It is simply a matter of putting
the cart before the horse. Thus, the true rationale in invoking the
political question rule is not
case = political issue = nonjusticiable
but rather
case = nonjusticiable = political question doctrine.
A succinct statement of this proposition was offered a half century
11
ago:
There are certain cases which are completely without the sphere
of judicial interference. They are called, for historical reasons,
"political questions." What are these political questions? To what
matters does the term apply? It applies to all those matters of which
the court, at a given time, will be of the opinion that it is impolitic
or inexpedient to take jurisdiction. Sometimes this idea of inexpediency will result from the fear of the vastness of the consequences
that a decision on the merits might entail. Sometimes it will result
from the feeling that the court is incompetent to deal with the particular type of question involved. Sometimes it will be induced by
9 Sevilla v. Elizalde, 112 F.2d 29, 32 (D.C. Cir. 1940).
10 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962).
11 Finkelstein, Judicial Self-Limitation, 37 HARv. L. REv. 338, 544-45 (1924). Another
explanation of this doctrine was proffered in 62 H.atv. L. REv. 659 (1949):
The doctrine will defeat jurisdiction where the courts have no mechanism for
compelling the disclosure of information adequate to support a decision, or where
the argument and decision of the question in the public judicial forum would
seriously embarrass governmental activities of extreme delicacy which are dearly
entrusted by the Constitution to another department of government. Or, a decision may be withheld because of the high probability that the courts would
require the assistance of the legislative arm to enforce their decisions and because
the possible public consequences of decision are vastly disproportionate to those
of ordinary litigation. Or, the decision may be thought to require a review of
procedural formalities in the coordinate branches of government which should
be within the unqualified coitrol of those branches.
Id. at 663.
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the feeling that the matter is "too high" for the courts. But always
there will be a weighing of considerations in the scale of political

wisdom.
Thus, although there is a diversity of theory concerning the basis for
the political question doctrine, 12 it is primarily invoked when the facts
of the controversy, or other practical considerations, render the issue
inappropriate for judicial determination. Perhaps this is why "political
question" has been described as a residual term, comprehensible only
3
in terms of the particular facts which give rise to its application.'
Although the federal courts have held several classes of cases to
involve political questions, 14 basic similarities exist in most, if not all,
cases: '5
1. The issue itself is committed to either the legislature or the
executive for final determination, with no provision for judicial evaluation;
2. The function is organically "political," i.e., pertaining to the
administration of government, either state or federal, as well as foreign
relations;
3. Where judicial review is implied, it would be ineffectual because
a. there are no manageable standards by which the court can

resolve the issue; or
b. it could not render finality to the controversy; or

c. any judicial resolution would be incapable of enforcement.
Any further discussion of the theoretical bases and historical justifications for the invocation of the political question doctrine would

be unnecessary. Suffice it to say that, upon determining that an issue
sounding in politics is inappropriate for judicial inquiry, the courts
will designate it a "political question" and be done with it. Far out12 Compare Finkelstein, supra note 11; Field, The Doctrine of Political Questions in
the Federal Courts, 8 MINN. L. REV. 485 (1924); Weston, Political Questions, 38 HAv. L.
REV. 296 (1925).
13 24 NOTRE DAmE LAw. 231, 236 (1949).
14 Field, supra note 12, lists seven main categories: negotiations, violation, and
termination of treaties; beginning and ending of war; admission and deportation of aliens;
jurisdiction over territory; recognition of states, governments, war, and measures short
of war; status of Indian tribes; and the guarantee of a republican form of government.
See also note 13 supra.
15 See Highland Farms Dairy, Inc. v. Agnew, 300 U.S. 608 (1937); Oetjen v. Central
Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297 (1918); Pacific States Telephone Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118
(1912); Taylor v. Beckham, 178 U.S. 548 (1900); Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1
(1849); Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829); Kirk v. Boehm, 216 F. Supp. 952 (ED.
Pa. 1963), aff'd, 376 U.S. 512 (1964). See also Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969);
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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weighing any occasional injustice 6 resulting from this procedure is a
practical utility which cannot be ignored.
"No political truth is certainly of greater intrinsic value or is
stamped with the authority of more enlightened patrons than the
maxim [that] . . . the three great departments of power should be
separate and distinct."' 17 True though this statement may be, the
writers of the Federal Constitution nevertheless violated its basic tenet
by subjecting the presidential appointment power to the advice and
consent of the senate."' It is significant, however, that the propriety of
this interweaving of authority has never been seriously questioned.
This bi-departmental procedure for appointments was early accepted
by the Supreme Court, 19 and in the case at bar the challenge is not to
the constitutionality of advice and consent, but rather a derivative
practice, viz., senatorial courtesy.
In holding that the custom of senatorial courtesy is a nonjusticiable
issue, the court recalled the discussion attending the adoption of the
appointment procedure at the New Jersey State Constitutional Convention of 1844. The framers of the constitution were aware of the
shortcomings of the advice and consent system, having witnessed its
operation on the national level. Yet they accepted this procedure,
20
thereby withholding from the judiciary any authority to intervene.
The separation of powers rule was thus invoked with regard to the
judicial right to intervene, while the checks and balances doctrine was
cited as justifying the adoption of the advice and consent procedure.
As an additional ground for reaching its decision, the court cited
Baker v. Carr,21 where it was stated:
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political
question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of
16 In Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831), the Georgia legislature
passed an act which would virtually annihilate the Cherokees as a political society, and
seize all the lands of the Cherokee nation in Georgia, if enforced. Refusing to interfere,
the Supreme Court, speaking through Chief Justice Marshall, stated that any interposition
"savors too much of the exercise of political power, to be within the proper province of
the judicial department .... If it be true, that wrongs have been inflicted, and that still
greater are to be apprehended, this is not the tribunal which can redress the past or
prevent the future." Id. at 20. But see Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 215-16 n.43 for a different
interpretation of this case.
17 THE FEDERALLsT, (No. 47) at 324 (U. Cooke ed. 1961) (Madison).
18 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, ci. 2.
19 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 155-56 (1803).
20 See Kligerman v. Lynch, 92 N.J. Super. 373, 223 A.2d 511 (Ch. Div. 1966), cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 822 (1967).
21 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
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judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it;
or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without
expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of the government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a
political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments
on one question.
The first test-a "textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department"-is applicable to
the case at bar, since the Governor's power to nominate and appoint,
and the Senate's power to advise and consent, are clear commitments
derived from the text of the constitution itself. 22 However, the fact that
a branch of the government is constitutionally empowered to perform
certain functions does not necessarily preclude it from judicial review.
It is the province of the judiciary to inquire whether acts of the other
two branches are within the bounds of constitutionality. This power
is nut an assumed prerogative, nor any assertion of a superiority of the
courts over the other governmental departments, but rather a discharge
of the duties imposed upon the judiciary by the constitution itself,
under the general scheme of checks and balances upon which our con23
stitutional system of government was conceived and founded.
Also cited by the court as determinative of the nonjusticiability
of the issue of senatorial courtesy was the second of the analytical
threads comprising the political question doctrine as set forth in Baker
v. Carr,i.e., "a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards
for resolving it." Assuming that the Senate fails to confirm a judicial
nomination, either by abstaining from voting or by rejecting it by
ballot, the court would be compelled to delve "into the thought processes and motivations which led each individual senator to vote or not
25
vote as he did. ' 24 As the court aptly states:
How is a judicial inquiry to be undertaken to find out whether, in
fact, inaction on the part of the Senate results from a deference to
the tradition and practice of senatorial courtesy or from some other
cause? Are senators to be interrogated as to the reasons and motivations for their actions or their inaction?
Thus, the court examined the facts of the controversy as submitted to
§ 6, par. 1.
Denison v. State, 61 S.W.2d 1017, 1019 (Tex. Civ. App.), error refused, 122 Tex.
459, 61 S.W.2d 1022 (1933).
24 Kligerman v. Lynch, 92 N.J. Super. 373, 376, 223 A.2d 511, 513 (Ch. Div. 1966).
25 108 N.J. Super. at 173, 260 A.2d at 268.
22 See N.J. CONST. art. VI,
23
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it, determined, for various reasons, that any judicial resolution on the
merits would be impracticable, and consequently invoked the political
question doctrine. The propriety of this procedure, at least in the case
at bar, cannot be questioned.
As has been mentioned, in determining that the issue of senatorial
courtesy is nonjusticiable, the court apparently disregarded the personal motives and political maneuvers which occasioned the controversy. The question arises as to whether the political background
should be a factor in the result. Obviously not, because no matter what
reasons lay behind the senatorial inaction, the fact remains that judicial
intervention would be ineffective. An understanding of the cause would
not, at least in this case, render the issue suitable for judicial review.
But what of the plaintiffs; are they without a remedy? It would
appear so, for although temporary measures, such as transferring judges
from one county to another, reassigning judges from criminal to
civil cases within a county, and increasing the amount of available
judge time by lengthening the court day or even the court week, can
be taken to help alleviate crowded court calendars, the official forum
for relief is "the bar of public opinion," 26 which is a kind way of stating
that the plaintiffs have no legal redress. But a temporary annoyance,
and perhaps even an occasional injustice, 27 should be tolerable, if indeed not welcome, in order to protect the constitutional mandate of an
effective and realistic advice and consent procedure.
26
27

Id.
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).

